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Abstract 
In deregulated electricity markets, the transmission network is a key infrastructure for enabling 
competition in the generation sector. A deficient expansion of the transmission grid prevents the 
realization of the benefits in terms of efficiency associated with market mechanisms. 
Consequently, it is essential to provide clear investment policies and economic signals to attract 
timely and efficient transmission investments in order to develop the system at minimum cost 
meeting the requirements of generators and consumers, while keeping adequate levels of service 
quality and reliability. This paper proposes a modern tool of economic evaluation based on Real 
Options Analysis that provides the regulator the ability to assess various incentives that would 
lead transmission investors to make efficient decisions in highly uncertain environments. Real 
Options properly values partially irreversible investment decisions, such as to defer, modify or 
abandon an investment project in response to the arrival of new information or as uncertainties 
are resolved. Decisions are evaluated from the point of view of a transmission investor trying to 
maximize its own profits in the time period set to recover the capital invested. The results allow 
the study of the behavior of transmission investors regarding their decision making when they 
have the possibility to manage the option to defer, under different regulatory schemes that 
encourage the expansion of the transmission system. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, the electricity industry has faced major and significant structural and 
paradigmatic changes. The main objective of this restructuring has been to encourage the 
competition in the generation sector and provide freedom of choice for consumers in order to 
improve economic efficiency in delivering electricity. A crucial step has been the separation of 
the generation, transmission, distribution and marketing segments into autonomous businesses. 
The generation and marketing sectors were framed as purely competitive activities, not so the 
transmission and distribution sectors, which, mainly due to their still significant economies of 
scale, remained as regulated monopolies. 
The transmission network has a vital role in competitive electricity markets because it is the 
central infrastructure that enables competition in the generation sector. Its main function is to 
provide open access without discrimination to the transmission network to both generators and 
consumers. It is also a vital system in the development of renewable energy as it links important 
remote renewable resources to consumption centers.  
Given the importance of the transmission infrastructure to the objectives of competitive markets, 
it is imperative that the regulatory frameworks create incentives to undertake timely transmission 
investments that improve economic efficiency, reduce overall costs of meeting demand, preserve 
security of supply, promote the integration of renewable energies and encourage competition.  
Under a market setting, the regulatory authorities face the need to provide incentives for 
technical and economic efficiency, so that the transmission system is developed at minimum 
cost, with adequate levels of service quality and reliability, and adapted to the requirements of 
generators and consumers (Wu and Wen, 2006). 
In addition to the creation of stable regulatory regimes, predictable and transparent, it is 
necessary to combine them with a range of flexible financing tools that can address the specific 
risks faced by investors when evaluating projects in transmission infrastructure. Uncertainty is 
key factor when assessing transmission projects. Consequently, the regulatory bodies need tools 
for adequately evaluating investments in the transmission system under conditions of high 
uncertainty. 
Modern literature about the valuation of investments in real assets recognizes the Real Options 
Analysis (ROA) as an advanced tool for valuing irreversible investment projects which posse 
managerial flexibility in the decision making as prevailing uncertainties are (partially) resolved 
as new (though never complete) information arrives over time (Schwartz and Trigeorgis, 2004; 
Feinstein and Lander, 2002; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Since investment projects in the electric 
power transmission have indeed these characteristics, the potential of Real Option Analysis can 
be fully exploited. 
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This paper proposes the implementation of a modern tool of economic evaluation based on ROA 
that allows the regulatory body to analyze various mechanisms to efficiently encourage 
investment projects in power transmission capacity. Real Options Analysis enables the 
regulatory authority to analyze investor behavior with respect to decision-making in terms of 
cost and the duration of the construction license; the impact of recognizing a premium on cost of 
capital upon the investment decision; the appropriate level of regulated returns that encourages 
private investment; and the implications of introducing maximum market prices (price-caps) on 
investor behavior in transmission. This analysis serves for determining the parameters value of 
the regulatory framework design for merchant transmission in order to provide efficient and 
timely signals to promote expansion of the power network infrastructure. 
This reminder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the difficulties of 
traditional methods to assess irreversible investments under uncertainty and managerial 
flexibility and provides the fundamentals of Real Option Analysis. A simulation-based method 
for valuing Real Option in the context of power transmission investments is described in Section 
3. Regulatory incentives for transmission system expansion under merchant transmission scheme 
are quantitatively assessed in Section 4. Besides, detailed results about the value of the option to 
defer the transmission investment as a function of regulatory actions are illustrated and 
discussed. Conclusions and policy recommendations are provided in Section 5. 
 
2. Background  
2.1. Valuation of flexible investments under uncertainty 
Among the traditional methods for assessing investment, the net present value of discounted cash 
flows (NPV) is perhaps the most widely appraisal tool spread among practitioners, companies 
and decision makers. However this approach is not exempt of important drawbacks. In addition 
to the problem of forecasting and discounting future cash flows, the main disadvantage of NPV-
based methods is that they cannot adequately address the issue of flexibility in decision-making 
under uncertain future circumstances. 
The NPV decision rule prescribes to undertake investments with positive net present values and, 
otherwise reject them. However, with this immediate acceptance/rejection decision, the NPV 
implicitly ignores the value of the real options typically embedded in capital investment projects, 
such as the option to postpone an investment, the option to expand or contract the installed 
capacity, the option to close a business, or the option of abandoning the project for a salvage 
value, according to unfolding future circumstances. When market conditions are highly 
uncertain, flexibility options present in projects can add significant value and become attractive. 
In a context of considerable uncertainty, it is demonstrated that the NPV approach substantially 
underestimates the value of capital investments leading to inefficient or plainly wrong decisions 
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(Keswani and Shackleton, 2006; Schwartz and Trigeorgis, 2004; Feinstein and Lander, 2002; 
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
Unlike the NPV approach, Real Options Analysis can properly account for the economic value 
of having the flexibility to change or revise decisions later when the uncertainty around critical 
variables is resolved. As is shown in Miller and Park (2002), while the analysis of discounted 
cash flows is applicable only to projects with low-volatility returns or now-or never investment 
opportunities, ROA is applicable to most projects because of its effectiveness to manage the high 
volatility that characterizes investment projects under real conditions. The growing list of uses of 
ROA includes R&D industries (e.g. pharmaceuticals), technology investments, natural resource 
industries (oil, mining and forestry), manufacturing and stock projects (see Miller and Park 
(2002) and Trigeorgis (1996) for more details and references). 
 
2.2. Real Options Analysis 
The analysis of Real Options represent a conceptual extension of financial option theory (Black 
and Scholes, 1973) applied to tangible or real assets. A financial option gives its owner the right, 
but not the obligation, to buy or sell a financial asset at a specified price. Similarly, a firm that 
makes strategic investments has the right, but not the obligation, to take advantage of these 
opportunities to obtain a profit in the future. A strategic investment opportunity may be 
considered as a source of cash flows plus a series of options or contingent decisions. The Real 
Options approach, like financial options, provides the holder the right to protect against losses 
without limiting its earnings. 
Real Options Analysis helps executives to study from a new perspective the opportunities to plan 
and manage strategic investments (Myers, 1984). Real Options can be present in plans, projects 
or flexible business investments. These options may be to postpone, expand, contract or even 
abandon the investment projects. Other types of Real Options can be to change the use, modify 
the technology or extend the lifetime of the project. Some options occur naturally. Others may be 
deliberately planned or built at a determined cost. 
The presence of Real Options increases the value of an investment project. The value of a project 
with flexibility is determined as the value of the project without options, classically calculated 
using the traditional NPV, plus the monetary value of the flexibility provided by the managerial 
options: 
NPVflexible =NPVclassic + Value of Real Options (1) 
As the value of the options (flexibility) is always positive, the inequality NPVflexible ≥ NPVclassic 
holds. 
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The potential of the Real Options methodology is reflected in the valuation of investment 
projects in which the following conditions holds: the investment project is partially or 
completely irreversible, there is uncertainty about the future performance of the investment, the 
management has some flexibility regarding the opportunity for effectively carrying out the 
investment, and it is possible to acquire new information about the future evolution of a relevant 
variable, although this information may be incomplete. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Evaluation of investments in transmission capacity with Real Options 
In the last decade, Real Options Analysis has seen an important development in the field of 
electricity markets. The introduction of competitive markets and the large number of 
participating agents dramatically increased the uncertainty about key market variables. The main 
reason for the increase of uncertainty is the decentralization of decision-making, the competitive 
strategies of the agents and regulatory frameworks that often require periodical adjustments. 
Most applications of ROA are concentrated in the generation sector, mainly oriented to the 
valuation of investments on different generation technologies and fuel types. The implementation 
and development of ROA in the power transmission sector has been very limited, focusing on 
general concepts and with few specific applications to real problems (Pringles et al., 2007). In 
recent years the importance of this technique has been shown and some important progress has 
been achieved (Blanco et al., 2011; Vazquez and Olsina, 2007; Wijnia, 2005). 
The valuation of Real Options embedded in the expansion investments of the transmission 
system has important and particular characteristics. As a consequence not all Real Options 
valuation methods are appropriate for appraising these types of investments. Transmission 
investments are American-type options (which can be exercised at any point in time during their 
lifetime), the decisions have a path-dependent nature and the value of the underlying assets has 
multiple sources of uncertainty. 
Investments with the above characteristics cannot be properly evaluated by the traditional 
methods developed for financial options, such as the Black-Scholes method (Black and Scholes, 
1973) and binomial lattices (Cox et al., 1979), as theoretical conditions for applying these 
approaches are typically not satisfied in transmission investment projects. Consequently, recent 
research and developments in computational finance have focused on numerical simulation 
methods for valuating complex options with multiple uncertain variables and path-dependent 
features. 
A stochastic simulation method called Least Squares Monte Carlo (LSMC) developed by 
Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) has been proposed in the field of computational finance to 
appraise American-type options. The LSMC method combines Monte Carlo simulations with 
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stochastic dynamic programming. The continuation function of the Bellman equation is 
estimated by means of least squares linear regression techniques. The estimated continuation 
value is an unbiased and efficient estimator of the conditional expectation function. By 
estimating the continuation function, the optimal exercise rule for the option can be found 
without exhaustively evaluating the state space. 
The option valuation method through LSMC presents a great potential for assessing investments 
in electric power transmission under a market environment. Indeed, the LSMC simulation 
method properly evaluate American type options; it incorporates a direct treatment of all types of 
assets; the value of the underlying asset does not need to have a log-normal probability 
distribution; it can take into account many sources of uncertainties with different types of 
stochastic behavior; it does not require that the returns of the underlying asset have a constant 
variance; and the dimensionality problem that characterizes conventional stochastic dynamic 
programming algorithms is circumvented. 
Another important property the LSMC method is its suitability to the application of distributed 
computing techniques, which dramatically accelerate calculation times. This is a very important 
feature when evaluating investments in the transmission system. In fact, in order to obtain the 
annual revenues of a transmission project it is necessary, for each level of demand and operating 
state of the system, to determine the locational marginal prices (LMP) at each system node 
during the time horizon, typically a decade or more. Indeed, without the aid of distributed 
computing techniques, the valuation of investments in the transmission infrastructure would be 
impractical or infeasible with current computer technology. 
 
3.2 Valuation of the deferral option  
The option to defer corresponds to a simple American-type option, i.e., the holder has the right to 
exercise the option to invest at any time until the expiration date, to the extent that the driving 
uncertainties are unveiled. 
The value of an American option that has not yet been exercised at time t  is given by the 
following expression: 
    ( )
( , )
max (1 ) Π ,τ t τQτ t TF t r e τ X¡ 
 

     (2) 
where ( , )t T¡  is the set of optimal exercise times in the interval [ , ]t T , T  being the expiration 
date of the option. [ ]Q   represents the risk-neutral expected value operator, conditional to the 
information set available at t , and Π( , )ττ X is the revenue function of the option at the time 
instant τ . 
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The LSMC evaluation method provides an approximate path for the optimal stopping rule that 
maximizes the value of the American option. It is considered that the options may be exercised 
in N  discrete times 10 ... Nt t T     , where T  is the expiration date of the option. The value 
of the option can be approximated considering a large enough N . 
The evaluation begins by generating a number of paths w , which simulate the stochastic 
dynamics of each of the state variables tX , that affect the value of the option. The aim of LSMC 
is to provide an exercise rule that maximizes the value of the option at each time step along each 
simulated path. The evaluation begins at the expiration date and continues recursively until the 
instant 0t  . 
The value of the underlying asset is compared with the value of exercising the option on the 
expiration date. The optimal exercise strategy for the postponement option, similar to a financial 
option to buy (call option), is to exercise the option if the value of the underlying asset is greater 
than the strike price; in this case it is said that the option is in the money. When the value of the 
underlying asset is lower than the value of exercising the option, it is allowed to expire without 
being exercised. In this case, it is said that the option is out of the money. The option value is 
therefore given by the classical formula: 
   , max , , 0F T w S T w K     (3) 
where  ,F T w represents the value of the option to defer at the instant T for the path w ; the 
price of the underlying asset  ,S T w  is the expected cash flow generated by the project minus 
the value of the cash flow which has been renounced,  N RI I , and the exercise price K  is the 
difference in the cost of executing the project between the instant of time t T  and 0t  , 
 0I IC C , which gives the value of the option as: 
   0( , ) max ; 0N R I IF T w I I C C       (4) 
where NI  is the present value of the income obtained from the moment the project is executed 
t T . RI is the present value of the renounced income supposing the project had been executed 
at the instant 0t   . IC  represents the cost of the investment at the time instant T  and 0IC  is the 
present value of the cost incurred at 0t  . 
Over an instant of time it , where it  is the -thi  instant before the expiration date, the optimal 
strategy results from comparing the immediate exercise value (the cash flows that exercising the 
option would generate) with the expected cash flows from continuing, i.e. keeping the option 
alive. In this case, the optimal decision is to exercise if the immediate exercise value is positive 
and greater than the conditional expected value of continuing: 
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   ( , ) max , ,Φ ,i i iF t w S t w K t w     (5) 
The theory of arbitrage-free valuation implies that the value of continuing, or equivalently, the 
value of the option, assuming it has not been exercised before the instant of time it , is given by 
the expectation of the cash flows generated by the option  1Π , , ,iτ t T w  discounted with respect 
to a measure of risk-free valuation Q , r  being the risk-free discount rate on which the owner 
follows the optimal stopping strategy for every τ , with 1it τ T   . 
     1( ) 1Φ , 1 Π , , ,i it ti Q it w r τ t T w        (6) 
The value of the option is maximized along the path if the investor exercises it as soon as the 
immediate exercise value is greater than or equal to the value of continuing. Thus, the key to 
optimally exercising an American style option is to estimate the value of continuing, this being 
the main difficult of the method. 
The LSMC approach uses least squares regression techniques to approximate the conditional 
expectation function at each of the time instant t , which are represented as a linear combinations 
of subsets of orthonormal basis functions { }L : 
 
1
Φ , ( ) ( , )t m m m
m
t X φ t L t X


   (7) 
Generally, the functions used are Hermite functions, Legendre, Chebyshev, Jacobi polynomials, 
Fourier series, polynomial powers, among others (Longstaff and Schwartz, 2001). 
The values of mφ  are estimated by least-square regression of  Φ ,M tt X  with M elements of 
the selected base functions and M   . 
        1
( )
11
1 1
ˆ arg min ( ) ( , ) 1 , , ,j ii
M
m
M NM t t
i m i m i t im φ m j i
φ t φ t L t X r F j t T

     
       (8) 
Where   is the norm of the Hilbert vector space, M    from which the estimated value of the 
continuation function results: 
 
1
ˆ ˆΦ , ( ) ( , )i i
M
M i t m i m i t
m
t X φ t L t X

   (9) 
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To determine the estimated value of the continuation function,  Φˆ , iM i tt X , only the paths that 
are in the money are considered, as the decision to exercise is only relevant for this condition. In 
this way, we restrict ourselves to the region over which the conditional expectation must be 
estimated, which reduces the number of base functions needed to obtain a good approximation of 
the continuation function. 
Once  Φˆ , iM i tt X  is estimated for the instant it , we can determine whether the exercise of the 
option is optimal or not. Then, the optimal exercise moment ( )τ w  at each instant of time t  
occurs if the condition    ˆVP( , ) Φ , ii M i tt w t X is satisfied. 
As soon as the exercise decision is identified for time it , it is possible to determine the path of 
the cash flows of the option for the instant 1it  . In this way, the recursive process continues 
backward, repeating the procedure until the exercise decisions are determined for each exercise 
time along each path. This recursive procedure determines the optimal exercise boundary for 
each one of the w  paths simulated. 
Finally, the estimated value of the options is computed by discounting the cash flow resulting 
from the optimal exercise of the options back to the instant 0t  , at the risk-free rate and taking 
the average over all w  sample paths: 
   ( )
1
1(0) 1 ,
W τ w
w
F r F τ w
W 
   (10) 
 
3.3 Regulatory incentives to the expansion of the transmission system 
The aim of regulating the transmission business is to provide a normative framework guiding 
towards efficient and timely expansion of the transmission network, adapted to current and future 
needs of the power system and according to some specified reliability criteria.  
After more than two decades of having competitive markets in the electricity sector, there is still 
much debate about the most efficient way to attract timely investments towards the efficient 
development of the transmission network. 
Two rather opposite approaches have emerged as incentive mechanisms to develop the 
expansion of the transmission system. The first is a fully regulated mechanism where the 
regulatory agency sets the desired expansion project and establishes the compensation rules for 
the transmission service. Under this scheme, the risk of bad decisions is put on consumers. The 
second mechanism relies on price signals and expectations of profitability for guiding investors 
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in the necessity of new transmission. This scheme is often referred as merchant transmission and 
risk of wrong investment decisions are fully beared by the transmission incumbents. 
Various international experiences show that the models based on regulated investments do not 
generate sufficient incentives for the expansion of the transmission system. On the other hand, 
mechanisms base on locational marginal pricing do not compensate all transmission costs 
(Joskow and Tirole, 2005; Rosellón; 2003; Perez-Arriaga et al., 1995). 
With the aim of overcoming the limitations of current methods, hybrid methods that combine the 
features of regulated and market approaches and that provide incentives for an efficient 
expansion of the transmission system are being investigated. Recently, some regulatory schemes, 
that mix elements of the regulated and the merchant approach, have been proposed (Hogan et al., 
2010, Blanco et al., 2009, Littlechild, 2003). 
For recovering investments, a hybrid regulatory approach from a market remuneration scheme 
combined with a mechanism of complementary charges can be structured. Such an arrangement 
minimizes the financial risk to which investors are exposed. 
Under this mechanism, the regulatory authority has a policy of active participation, as it can 
provide economic signals through the complementary charges that encourage investment in 
transmission infrastructure. 
This model has desirable properties for an efficient payment of the transmission. The variable 
part of the income comes from the market approach and is related to the efficiency of nodal price 
signals, while the complementary charges seek to limit the volatility of revenues that arises from 
the difference between nodal prices and the allocated transmission rights, providing some hedge 
to market participants. 
In order to establish incentives that encourage efficient and timely transmission investments, the 
regulatory authority must be able to properly assess the attractiveness of projects, their risks and 
the managerial flexibility, so as to design a regulatory framework that provides the proper 
economic signals for achieving a desired expansion plan. 
3.4 Assessment of regulatory incentives by Real Options Analysis 
Real Options Analysis is a modern economic valuation approach that facilitates the analysis of 
decision-making on transmission capacity under different types of economic and financial 
incentives that the regulatory authority could provide in a mixed remuneration framework. 
This work proposes and evaluates a number of incentives that can be provided to merchant 
transmission investors under the structure of complementary charges, in addition to revenues 
arising from LMP differences, in order to reduce the risk exposure and encourage a timely 
expansion of the transmission system: 
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 Expiration time and cost of acquiring the construction license. The regulator can modify the 
term of the construction license in order to attract investments in transmission capacity. 
Additionally, the regulator can determine the appropriate value of the construction license to 
encourage immediate investment in transmission capacity. In this regard, it may result that 
the license value is negative; in this case, the investor may receive additional monetary 
compensation for the immediate expansion of the transmission system. 
 Additional premium on the capital cost of the investment project under certain conditions of 
entry into the system. The aim is to encourage the early entry of strategic investments. From 
the consumer perspective, this is justified on the basis that the timely entry of investments 
generates more benefits than the premium granted to the investors. The premium over the 
cost of capital determined from ROA will be allocated among the transmission users through 
a complementary charge in the electricity tariff. 
 Guaranteed returns level. The regulator can set a percentage of the value of the initial 
investment that investors may receive as annual additional income. This would reduce the 
financial risk associated to the expansion of the transmission system. The incentive 
encourages the transporter agent to identify the necessary expansions and to submit them to 
the market under a baseline scenario. 
 Price caps. ROA allows the regulatory authority to determine the impact of price caps for 
curbing market power in the electricity market on the signal for merchant transmission 
investments. An adequate level of the price cap would reduce the complementary charges of 
the electricity tariff that are necessary to encourage investment in transmission.  
4. Results and Discussions 
In order to understand how the regulatory body can use the Real Options Analysis as a regulatory 
design tool we developed a simple example of investment in transmission capacity. The various 
actions that the regulator can consider to encourage the expansion of the transmission system are 
evaluated, and the economic signals that the investor ultimately perceives are analyzed and 
discussed in detail.  
4.1. The example case 
The considered investment project consists of an interconnection linking two electrically isolated 
power systems. The transmission line has a length of 350 km and an initial investment cost of 
89.4 MUS$. Transmission capacity of the interconnection is set equal to 1000 MW. Fig. 1 shows 
the topology of two power systems under analysis. 
The interconnection project will be built under the mixed regulatory approach for remunerating 
the expansion. The transmission investor will receive market revenues as well as regulated 
complementary charges. 
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With respect to the market structure, since the investment project is a radial line linking two 
autonomous systems, the investor receives long-term transmission rights (LTFTR) for a capacity 
equivalent to the total capacity of the transmission line. The LTFTR are awarded to the 
transmission investor for a period of 25 years. 
The revenues of a merchant interconnection project arise from the difference in locational energy 
prices between both systems times the amount, in MW, of the LTFTR awarded to the owner of 
the transmission line. Complementary charges may be determined by the regulatory authority. 
Regulated revenues have duration equal to the lifetime of the allocated LTFTR. These charges 
help lessen the risk exposure of investors while encouraging the timely expansion of the 
transmission system. 
For both regions, power demand is represented by a two-block load duration curve. The 
generation systems comprise solely thermal generating units. The generation capacity and the 
reliability of the generating units are represented by an equivalent generator for each system. 
Regardless of the aggregation of power plants for the sake of simplicity in the example, the 
number of system components modeled in the assessment methodology is unconstrained. Tables 
I, II and III provide the system data for the simulation of demand and both generation systems. 
< Figure 1 around here > 
The decision on the transmission investment project is subject to the uncertainty in demand 
growth in both systems, generation costs and the availability of the system components. The 
uncertainty in demand growth in each region is modeled by a Geometric Brownian Motion 
(GBM) (Marathe and Ryan, 2005). The model takes into consideration the cross-correlation 
between the growth rates of both systems. Hourly generation costs are assumed to be a quadratic 
function of power delivered, i.e. marginal generation costs are linear. The uncertainty in 
generation costs is derived from the uncertainty in the prices of fuels consumed by the generating 
units. The stochastic dynamics of fuel prices is modeled by a mean reversion process with 
Poisson jumps (Martzoukos and Trigeorgis, 2002). As it is customary in reliability studies, the 
uncertainty on the operating state of system components is modeled as a two-state (Operation-
Failure) Markov process (Billinton and Allan, 1996), which entails that residence time of system 
components in both states are exponentially distributed. Table III provides the failure rate and 
the repair rate, λ and µ respectively, of system components. The failure probability, denoted by 
Pr(F) , of each component can be computed as: 
( )
Pr(F)=
( ) ( )
t
t t
l
m l+  (11) 
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If system components are assumed to resided in only two mutually exclusive states, operating or 
failure respectively, the probability of operation Pr(O)  of system components can be determined 
by the complementary identity Pr(F)+Pr(O)=1 . 
The valuation of the investment project considers that the project can be deferred. Applying Real 
Options Analysis, the value of the option to delay the decision to proceed, i.e. wait for better 
information, is analyzed under various regulatory incentives. 
The cost of capital to discount the cash flows and calculate the value of traditional NPV is 
12%/yr. The prevailing risk-free discount rate to determine the value of the option to defer is 
considered as 5%/yr. 
< Table I around here > 
< Table II around here > 
< Table III around here > 
4.2.Value of the option to defer the investment as a function of regulatory actions 
 
4.2.1. Validity and value of the construction license 
In this Section, the impact of the expiration time and cost of the construction license issued by 
the authority on the financial performance of the investment project as well as on the investor 
behavior is assessed. 
The expected net present value (NPV) of the 500 kV interconnection line is negative and equal to 
$-30.2 MUS$. From the point of view of the transmission investor, considering only the value of 
the static NPV as foundation for making a decision on the investment project, as for instance it 
was a now-or-never opportunity, the project must be rejected. 
When considering the option to defer and wait for the unfolding development of the driving 
market variables, it is observed that as the flexibility to postpone the investment project is higher, 
the option to defer increases in value. Consequently, a project having an embedded option to 
delay delivers a higher monetary value than an identical project without such flexibility. Fig. 2 
and Fig. 3 show, respectively, the value of the option to defer and the value of the project with 
the option to defer embedded, as a function of the expiration time of the postponement option. 
< Figure 2 around here > 
< Figure 3 around here > 
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At the moment the option to defer expires, the investor loses the right to build the transmission 
line. In this sense, the expiration time of the option to defer is equal to the period of validity of 
the license to build the transmission line. 
If the regulatory authority wishes to encourage immediate investment, or at least that investors 
acquire a construction license, they must set a minimum expiration time of the option to defer 
equal to or greater than three years. If the expiration time exceed this period, the value of the 
flexible project takes a positive value. 
On the other hand, the regulatory authority should not set an exceedingly long expiration time. 
The value of the option to defer increases as the expiration time grows. In this sense, the investor 
will differ the investment project as much as possible, delaying the incorporation of the 
interconnection to the power system. This is one of the problems observed in the merchant 
approach to transmission investments. Merchant transmission projects holding long-lasting 
permits never materialize. 
Finally, if the immediate incorporation of the transmission is required, the regulatory authority 
could provide an economic incentive so that the flexible NPV of the investment project is greater 
than or equal to zero. This incentive would be distributed among end users as a fixed 
complementary charge through some tariff scheme. 
Regarding the value of the license, the value of the flexible NPV that exceeds the decision 
threshold (zero) for each expiration period of the option to defer can be taken as the maximum 
reference value of the construction license, with a date equivalent to the option to defer. 
Figure 4 shows the value of the construction license based on the expiration date. In addition, the 
figure represents the economic incentive that the regulator could offer investors as a way to 
encourage immediate investment in the transmission system. 
< Figure 4 around here > 
4.2.2. Additional premium over the capital cost of the project 
Under certain conditions, the regulatory authority can offer the investor an additional premium to 
offset the cost of capital to finance the investment project. The additional premium is computed 
on the tariff charged to the users, but this is justified on the basis that the timely entry of 
investments generates higher benefits to end users than the additional costs incurred. 
We present a case in which the regulatory authority considers the necessity that the investment 
enters in the next year. Therefore, the expiration time of the deferral option is one year and the 
capital cost of the investment project is 12%. 
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Figure 5 illustrates the value of the option to defer depending on the value of the offered 
premium. As the value of the premium increases, the value of the cost of capital that the investor 
must face decreases. Consequently, the value of the option to defer one year increases as the 
value of the premium recognized on the cost of capital investment increases. 
The value of the flexible project considering the option to defer for several offered premium 
values is depicted in Fig. 6. It is observed that the value of the project increases with the increase 
in the premium recognized on the cost of capital. Under the market compensation approach with 
an additional premium of two points (2%) on the cost of capital, the project becomes 
economically attractive and thus the interconnection project would actually be immediately 
carried out. 
< Figure 5 around here > 
< Figure 6 around here > 
4.2.3. Level of guaranteed returns 
The regulatory authority assures the investor that a percentage of the initial investment cost will 
be paid by end users through the electricity tariff as a fixed annuity for a period equal to the 
duration of the long-term transmission rights. In addition, the regulator can provide a mix 
between an option to defer (expiration time of the construction license) and the percentage of 
guaranteed return on investment. This incentive mechanism seeks to make the flexible NPV of 
the project greater than zero, in such a way as to attract capital investment.  
On the basis of the Real Options Analysis, the regulator body can evaluate the percentage of the 
initial capital that it must guarantee to the investor so that the project is economically attractive, 
considering also the option to defer the investment, as shown in Fig. 7. In this case, we observe 
that as the expiration time of the option increases, the percentage of return on the initial 
investment that the regulator must guarantee decreases. This shows that the cost to society of 
postponing the entry of a system element is offset by a decrease in the fixed income that would 
have to be paid for the duration of the compensation of the investment project. If only about 35% 
of the investment cost were guaranteed by means of regulated fixed revenues, the investment 
should be undertaken immediately. 
< Figure 7 around here > 
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4.2.4. Limit value of the energy prices 
The remuneration of a transmission project under the merchant regulatory design is a function of 
the locational energy price difference between the nodes interconnected by the transmission line 
and the capacity of the transmission rights allocated to the project. Under a situation of capacity 
shortfall in the importer node, i.e. there is not enough generating capacity to meet the power 
demand, the locational marginal price should escalate to the value of the lost load (VOLL). As 
the VOLL typically is very high, in many markets prices are caped below this value in order to 
curb market power exercised by generators. Under tight system conditions, the income of the 
owner of the transmission system is directly related to the value of the lost load or the ceiling 
price (price cap) established by the regulatory authority. 
While deficit scenarios are uncommon, when they happen generate a very high extra income to 
investors that can thus recover much of the fixed costs of investment during these shortfall 
events. 
Real Options Analysis is a powerful valuation tool for helping regulatory authority to analyze the 
behavior of transmission investments when different price cap policies are established in the 
marketplace. 
We again evaluate a transmission investment project with the option to defer. The option has an 
expiration time of one year and it is assumed that the regulator desire the investment to be 
executed within this period. The regulated rate of return on the initial investment needed to 
ensure the execution of the investment based on different values of price caps are determined by 
the Real Options Analysis. 
Figure 8 illustrates the behavior of the value of the investment project with the option to defer for 
one year for different values of guaranteed return rates on the initial investment when the value 
of price-cap is set at $1000/MWh. It is noted that as the level of regulated returns increases, the 
value of the flexible project increases too, reaching a point where the project starts to be 
economically feasible. 
Figure 9 describes the behavior of the level of return that it is necessary to guarantee to the 
investors so that the investment is carried out immediately according to different price-cap 
values. It is observed that as the value of the price cap value is set lower, the rate of the return 
that the regulator must guarantee to investors increases rapidly for compensating lower market 
revenues. If price cap is set over 4000 $/MWh, which is in the order to the cost of the unserved 
energy estimated in many systems, a guaranteed regulated return is no longer needed. This is an 
important finding, as it demonstrates that price caps set significantly below the VOLL, besides 
damaging the investment signal for new generation entry, also deteriorates the market signal for 
transmission expansion under the merchant regulatory design. 
< Figure 8 around here > 
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< Figure 9 around here > 
5. Conclusions 
The efficient and timely expansion of transmission systems in competitive electricity markets is 
a problem that has not been satisfactorily resolved yet. Nowadays, many electrical supply 
systems face problems of congestion, market power and low security and reliability levels 
because of insufficient investments in transmission infrastructure. 
Real Options Analysis is an advanced approach to economic valuation of irreversible 
investments in highly uncertain environments but with some degree of managerial flexibility. 
The valuation technique implemented is based on a stochastic simulation method called Least-
Squares Monte Carlo. This approach has the ability to evaluate complex and compound options 
(American style, path-dependent), and also consider several sources of uncertainty with different 
stochastic dynamics. 
Real Options Analysis allows the regulatory authority to quantitatively analyze various 
regulatory designs to encourage investment projects in power transmission capacity. We 
evaluated the performance of the investment as a function of cost and duration of the 
construction license; the impact of recognizing a premium on the cost of capital investment; the 
levels of regulated guaranteed returns that encourage immediate investment, and the influence of 
value of price caps for energy in order to provide correct signals for new infrastructure in power 
transmission. 
Seldom transmission projects are now-or-never investments opportunities. The results of this 
work show that transmission projects that appropriately consider the option to defer commitment 
in order to get better (though never complete information) have a significantly higher economic 
value than the project without this flexibility. 
Numeric parameters values of the regulatory design are as important as the design concept itself. 
The regulatory authority may adjust the minimum validity time of construction permits in order 
to encourage investors to acquire the license to build the interconnection. Additionally, 
regulators can limit the expiration date beyond this minimum validity time in order to prevent 
excessive delaying of the investment decision. 
The result of the flexible NPV of the project sets the level of economic incentives that the 
investment may require for immediate exercise. Furthermore, for each expiration period of the 
permits, the maximum cost of the construction license can be estimated by means of Real Option 
valuation techniques. 
When the regulatory authority can offer an additional premium to the investor that offsets a part 
of the cost of capital to finance the investment project, the value of the option to defer increases 
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with the value of the premium recognized on the cost of investment capital. Consequently, the 
value of a flexible project increases as the premium increases. In this regard, the optimal level of 
the premium on the cost of capital that the regulatory body may offer investors to encourage 
timely investment in the transmission system is determined by Real Options Analysis. 
In addition, Real Options Analysis enables the quantification of the percentage of the initial 
capital that the regulatory authority should guarantee to investors for the interconnection project 
to be economically attractive and executed within the expected time. 
Finally, Real Options Analysis has proved useful for analyzing the detrimental impact of setting 
price caps in the energy market significantly below the VOLL on the transmission expansion 
signal. 
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Fig. 1. Electric topology of the example case 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Monetary value of the option to defer investment decision 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Expected value of the project considering the option to defer 
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Fig. 4. Value of the construction license 
 
 
 
Fig.5. Value of the flexible project with the option to defer 
 
 
 
Fig.6. Value of the flexible project with the option to defer 
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Fig. 7. Guaranteed return on the initial investment that makes the project a profitable investment 
 
Fig. 8. Value of the flexible project based on the guaranteed return on the investment cost for a one-year license and 
a price cap of 1000 $/MWh 
 
Fig.9. Level of guaranteed return on the investment cost as a function of the price cap for turning the interconnection 
investment to be economically feasible 
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Table I. Electricity demand 
System Demand Duration Correlation Growth 
rate 
Standard   
deviation  Peak Base Peak Base  
 [MW] [MW] [h] [h]  [%] [%] 
A 900 750 2190 6570 0.65 2.00 2.00 
B 1750 1350 2190 6570 0.65 3.00 2.50 
 
Table II. Generation costs parameters 
Generation Initial 
price 
Long-term 
price 
Volatility Reversion 
coefficient 
Input-output function 
  a0 a1 a2 
 [$/MBTU] [$/MBTU]   [MBTU/h] [MBTU/MWh] [MBTU/MW2h]
GA 1.70 1.465 0.12 0.30 438.43 8.191 0.00644 
GB 2.115 1.750 0.12 0.30 285.40 8 0.00733 
 
Table III. Reliability parameters of system components 
Component Capacity λ µ Pr(F) 
 [MW] [h-1] [h-1]  
Generator A 5000 0.000001 0.495 0.00000202 
Generator B 5000 0.000001 0.190 0.00000111 
Line 1000 0.005 0.0495 0.0917 
 
 
